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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

Civil Rights-Judicial Consolidation of Public School
Districts To Achieve Racial Balance
I.

INTRODUCTION

Since the landmark decision of Brown v. Board of Education' in
1954, the Supreme Court, in a long sequence of cases, has forged increasingly stringent guidelines governing the desegregation of public
schools. The Court, however, has reserved the task of implementing its
desegregation orders for the lower courts. As a consequence, a variety
of remedial devices has been developed by the federal courts to dismantle dual school systems. In the recent decision of Bradley v. School
Board,2 a Virginia federal court ordered the consolidation of the predominantly black Richmond school district with the surrounding allwhite suburban school districts of Henrico and Chesterfield Counties.
This decision marks the first time that a court has consolidated two or
more autonomous school districts for the purpose of achieving a racial
balance in the schools that reflects the racial composition of the consolidated areas as a whole. While Judge Merhige in Bradley punctiliously
followed the principles enunciated by the Supreme Court in Swann v.
Charlotte-MecklenburgBoard of Education3 and its earlier desegregation cases, his decision, which called for the busing of suburban children
to inner city schools, was a primary factor contributing to the storm of
national protest against the use of busing to achieve racial balance. The
implications of this controversy are grave. It could lead to serious conflict between public opinion and the will of Congress on the one hand
and the duty of federal courts to uphold the Constitution on the other.
Focusing on the Bradley decision, this comment will review the major
Supreme Court decisions setting forth the constitutional standards for
dismantling dual school systems. The Bradley court's use of this authority in reaching the controversial school consolidation order will be discussed in detail and the decision will be analyzed both in terms of the
soundness of legal reasoning and the validity of its basic policy premises.
1. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
2. 338 F. Supp. 67 (E.D. Va., Jan. 5, 1972).
3. 402 U.S. 1 (1971).
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Finally, the comment will discuss briefly the future of court-ordered

school desegregation in light of the current, vociferous opposition to the
approach adopted by the Bradley court in its attempt to deal with the

serious national problem of achieving equal educational opportunity for
all.
II.

EVOLUTION OF REMEDIAL DEVICES FOR DESEGREGATION PURPOSES

A.

The Influence of Brown

In Brown v. Board of Education4 (Brown I) the Supreme Court

established the legal foundation for the multitude of public school desegregation cases that have inundated the federal courts since 1954. In this
landmark decision, the Court held that segregation on the basis of race

in the public schools was unconstitutional because it denied equal protection of the law to black school children.' In order to effectuate the

principles enunciated in Brown I, the Court, in Brown 1,1 vested in local
school authorities the full responsibility for desegregation and empowered the lower federal courts to hear all disputes related to school administration, physical plant conditions, and pupil transportation. 7 Because of its sweeping generality, the rationale of Brown I has been the

source of considerable dispute.8 Nevertheless, the majority of school
boards concluded that Brown I prohibits a school system from using
race as the criterion for assigning pupils to schools. This interpretation
was apparently endorsed by numerous per curiam Supreme Court decisions that cited Brown I as standing for the proposition that the equal
protection clause prohibits, as inherently arbitrary, classifications that
are based upon race.'
4. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
5. Id. at 494-95.
6. Brown v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
7. Id. at 300.
8. At least one commentator has argued that instead of holding that race is an inherently
arbitrary classification, Brown I held only that segregated schools deny black 'students an equal
educational opportunity. He suggests that this choice was deliberate because American institutions
had been based upon racial classifications for over 200 years. Also, he thought that the equal
educational opportunity rationale was consistent with Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950), and
McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents, 339 U.S. 637 (1950). Fiss, Racial Imbalance in the Public
Schools: the Constitutional Concepts, 78 HARV. L. REV. 564, 588-95 (1965). But see Kaplan,
Segregation Litigation and the Schools-Part II: The General Northern Problem, 58 Nw. U.L.
RaV. 157, 171-74 (1963); Pollack, RacialDiscriminationandJudicialIntegrity. A Reply to Professor Wechsler, 108 U. PA. L. REv. 1 (1959).
9. Schiro v. Bynum, 375 U.S. 395 (1964) (invalidated municipal ordinance requiring segregation in city auditorium); Johnson v. Virginia, 373 U.S. 61 (1963) (invalidated segregated courtroom
seating); Turner v. Memphis, 369 U.S. 350 (1962) (desegregated public restaurant); State Athletic
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In attempting to comply with Brown I, the school systems refrained
from overt racial discrimination during the late 1950's and early 1960's.
They were not, however, under an affirmative duty to restructure segregated school attendance zones that resulted from segregated housing
patterns or other private causes. Because black housing was usually
clustered within a particular area, integration could be achieved only in
those schools located on the periphery of the black residential areas. In
this context, the desegregation plan most commonly adopted by the
schools was the freedom-of-choice plan. Under this plan members of a
majority race were allowed to transfer outside their assigned attendance
zone to schools in which their race was in the minority. Despite its racial
neutrality, freedom-of-choice failed to achieve fully integrated school
systems because, in almost all cases, few whites were willing to transfer
to previously all-black schools. Contributing greatly to this lack of progress was the government's limited enforcement of the Brown I decision,
which was confined primarily to preventing the drawing of school attendance zones on a racial basis. As a result, by the late 1960's, even though
all the legal barriers preventing blacks from attending white schools had
been removed, the vast majority of public schools in the South were still
all white or all black.' 0
The Supreme Court's response to this impasse in the desegregation
of schools came in Green v. New Kent County School Board." The

Court struck down as constitutionally impermissible a freedom-ofchoice plan under which only a few black students attended formerly allwhite schools. The vast majority of blacks had elected to remain in
attendance at the all-black schools. The school board contended that it
had complied with the constitutional mandate enunciated in Brown I by
terminating all racially discriminatory practices and by permitting black
students to attend formerly all-white schools if they desired to do so.12
On the basis of those changes, it was the board's position that black
students were afforded an equal educational opportunity. The Court
found, nevertheless, that a dual school system still existed and, in defining "desegregation,"'" it stated for the first time that a school board
Comm'n v. Dorsey, 359 U.S. 533 (1959) (ordered integration of segregated athletic contests); New
Orleans City Park Improvement Ass'n v. Detiege, 358 U.S. 54 (1958) (public parks and golf
courses integrated); Holmes v. City of Atlanta, 350 U.S. 879 (1955) (integrated municipal golf
course); Mayor of Baltimore v. Dawson, 350 U.S. 877 (1955) (public beaches and bath houses

integrated).
10. See generally U.S.

COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, SURVEY OF SCHOOL DESEGREGATION IN

1965-66 (1966).
391 U.S. 430 (1968).
Brief for Respondents at 8-13, Green v. County School Bd., 391 U.S. 430 (1968).
The crucial issue in Green was the definition of "desegregation" that was required by
The Supreme Court, 1967 Term, 82 Harv. L. Rev. 63, 113 (1968).

THE SOUTHERN AND BORDER STATES

11.
12.
13.
Brown I.
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has an affirmative duty to establish a "unitary, nonracial system of
public education."' 4 In setting forth the requirements of a unitary system, the Court construed the equal protection clause expansively and
rejected the notion that the clause was merely a prohibition against the

use of race as a basis for classification.

s

Less than a year later, in

Alexander v. Holmes County Board of Education" the Court reviewed

the Green affirmative duty requirement for the first time. In a decision
reflecting the urgency of the school desegregation problem, the Court
ordered the immediate termination of the dual school system in 33
Mississippi school districts. The immediate effect of the decision was to
place more pressure than before on local school officials to devise desegregation plans that would comply with the unitary school concept.' 7
Unfortunately, given the Supreme Court's failure to establish satisfac-

tory guidelines for implementing the concept, local school officials as
well as the lower courts were faced with a complex and difficult task.
With varying degrees of success, a number of remedial devices were
attempted in an effort to dismantle dual school systems. 8 The lower

courts and the school boards were still uncertain about how far they
could go in restructuring the schools to comply with the Supreme
Court's desegregation rulings.
B.

The DoctrinalAdvances of Swann

In the wake of Alexander and Green, pressure mounted on the
Supreme Court to rule on the constitutionality of several of the remedial

desegregation devices that were being utilized in the lower courts. Finally, in Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, the
Court ruled on two of the more controversial o'f these devices-busing
and pupil assignment based on racial quotas. 2 The Court held that the

two devices are within the remedial powers of the district court under
14. 391 U.S. 430, 436 (1968).
15. Fiss, The Charlotte-Mecklenburg Case-Its Significance for Northern School
Desegregation, 38 U. CHi. L. REV. 697, 699 (1971); cf. 21 VAND. L. REV. 1093, 1098 (1968). See
generally 82 HARV. L. REV., supra note 13.
16. 396 U.S. 19 (1969).
17. See generally, Dimond, Reform of the Government of Education: A Resolution of The
Conflict Between "Integration" and "Community Control", 16 WAYNE L. REV. 1005 (1970).
18. Some of the remedial devices employed during this period to effectuate a unitary, nonracial school system were pairing of schools, rezoning, closing older schools to force consolidation,
and busing. 24 VAND. L. REV. 1243, 1247 (1971).
19. 402 U.S. 1 (1971).
20. Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 311 F. Supp. 265 (W.D.N.C. 1970). The
adopted desegregation proposal, called the "Finger Plan," required extensive busing only at the
elementary level. 24 VAND. L. REV. 1243, 1243 n.4, 1244 (1971).
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the equal protection clause.2" It also held that school systems containing

one-race schools will be found violative of equal protection unless local
school officials make an affirmative showing that these
schools are not
22
the result of past or present discriminatory practices.
In the Swann opinion, the Supreme Court made three significant

doctrinal advances toward the ultimate objective of disestablishing the
dual school system. First, the Court stated that whenever a dual school
system exists, a school board's primary responsibility is to eliminate the
distinction between the white and black schools. Prior to Swann, a
school board's duty was merely to consider the possible racial implications of its policies and practices. 23 Swann, however, accorded school
integration precedence over most coexisting eduational values, and

therefore required that every school board decision be consistent with
the duty to eliminate the dual school system.2 4 Secondly, the Supreme

Court held that the existence of all-white or all-black schools is not a
violation per se of the equal protection clause. Instead, it declared that
the presence of such schools creates a presumption that there is an equal
protection violation which can be overcome 25 only if the school board
can show that no relationship exists between its past or present actions
and the creation or perpetuation of racial imbalance.26 The Court suggested that a variety of indicia, such as the location of schools, school
building capacities, and faculty assignments, be examined in determining whether this prohibited relationship exists. A school board's failure
to explain the presence of one-race schools was viewed as sufficient to
justify a finding of state involvement in the discrimination and hence, a
violation of the equal protection clause.2? Swann's emphasis on past
21. 402 U.S. at 22-25, 29-31; 24 VAND. L. REV. 1243, 1245 (1971). The school assignment
method held inadequate was the geographic proximity plan-the assignments of pupils to schools
nearest their homes. The geographic proximity method is the plan used predominantly in the
North. Fiss, supra note 15, at 699.
22. See 82 HARV. L. REV., supra note 15, at 115.
23. Fiss, supra note 15, at 701.
24. 402 U.S. at 18-19; Fiss, supra note 15, at 701-02.
25. "[lIt should be clear that the existence of some small number of one-race, or virtually
one-race, schools within a district is not in and of itself the mark of a system that still practices
segregation by law . . . . [T]he burden upon school authorities will be to satisfy the court that
their racial composition is not the result of present or past discriminatory action on their part."
402 U.S. at 26.
26. Fiss, supra note 15, at 700. Fiss found 2 types of connections suggested by the Court:
(1) past discriminatory conduct by school board members that served to create or perpetuate a
segregated attendance pattern; (2) administrative decisions by board members that served to create
one-race schools.
27. Evan v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296 (1966); Lombard v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 267 (1963)
(Harlan, J., dissenting); Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715 (1961); Shelley v.
Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948); Van Alstyne & Karst, State Action, 14 STAN. L. REV. 3 (1961);
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discriminatory practices in finding de jure segregation reflects the
Court's broad construction of the state action requirement in school
desegregation cases. By determining the causes of racial imbalance from
essentially a hindsight point of view, a court can more easily perceive a
connection between school board action and the dual school system.
From the school board's standpoint, a more lenient state action test
would have been a determination of whether at the time of the allegedly
discriminatory action the school board could reasonably have foreseen,
as a direct consequence, the establishment of a dual school system. In
practice, the second test would have meant that a causal relationship
between state action and segregated schools would be more difficult to
show than under the hindsight approach. As a consequence, courts
would have placed more emphasis on the maintenance of strict racial
neutrality in the future than upon remedying the effects of the segregation of the past. Since that was the approach found to be so ineffective
in integrating the schools in the years preceding Green, the Supreme
Court in Swann had no alternative but to prefer the broader state action
test. Thirdly, before Swann, the argument had been advanced that any
assignment of pupils based upon race is a violation of the equal protection clause. Proponents of this position pointed out that pupil assignment policy based upon race would subject white students to compensatory discrimination, 8 a prospect that has been opposed bitterly by white
parents who do not want their children to attend inferior schools to
atone for the dejure segregation of the past. 29 Nevertheless, since Green
rejected the notion that the equal protection claus'e is merely a prohibition against the use of race as a criterion for classification, the validity
of compensatory discrimination has been an open question. In Swann,
the Supreme Court had its first opportunity to deal with the issue" and
the Court upheld the assignment of students on the basis of race as
within the remedial powers of the district courts.
As a result of the doctrinal advances in Swann, most metropolitan
Wellington, The Constitution,The Labor Union, and "Governmental Action," 70 YALE L.J. 345
(1961).
28. McAuliffe, School Desegregation: The Problem of Compensatory Discrimination, 57
VA. L. REV. 65, 87 (1971); see Bickel, Desegregation: Where Do We Go From Here?, THE NEW
REPUBLIC,

Feb. 7, 1970, at 20.

29. McAuliffe, supra note 28, at 83-91. The author uses the vivid example of 2 student
neighbors, one black and the other white. By refusing to allow the white student to enter the same
neighborhood school that his black neighbor attends, the courts are said to have unjustly discriminated on the basis of race, which is a denial of equal protection of the laws.
30. The result was presaged in United States v. Montgomery County Bd. of Educ., 395 U.S.
225 (1969), in which the Court upheld a district court order establishing a racial ratio of faculty
members throughout the entire school system.
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school systems in the country were subject to more sweeping desegregation orders than ever before." Unfortunately, it appears that the Supreme Court in Swann handled the problem of implementation guidelines for the lower courts in the same ineffective fashion that it did in
the Green and Alexander decisions. While the Court was commendably
attentive to the school children's safety requirements and the desirability
of avoiding unreasonably long bus trips to and from school, it failed to
appreciate the possible economic burden that a massive busing order
could create or the intense political opposition it could arouse, both of
which could make implementation much more difficult. Another consideration that the Swann Court seemed to have overlooked stems from
the situation in many larger cities, in which the public school system is
predominantly black while the surrounding suburban school systems are
almost all white. Under those particular circumstances, a busing order
applicable to the separate school systems could not succeed in
eliminating the racial imbalance unless some way could be found to bus
students in the all-white suburban schools to schools in the inner city
and vice versa.

III.

THE BRADLEY DECISION

Bradley v. School Board,32 a 1972 decision by the federal district
court situated in Richmond, Virginia, is the most recent attempt to
apply the Swann principles to a metropolitan area encompassing more
than one school district. Judge Merhige's task was particularly difficult
in this case, since the predominantly black Richmond school system
presented remedial difficulties not encountered in Swann. Therefore, in
arriving at a decision the court had the double problem of deciding what
the Swann decision in fact had held and then of extending its rationale
to questions that, for all practical purposes, were still open. A brief
summary of the facts will illustrate what the Court faced. In 1969 the
population of the public school system of Richmond was 70.5 percent
black. In September of 1970, the Richmond school system annexed an
almost all-white area, thereby lowering the black population ratio to
64.2 percent. Prior to the annexation, the enrollment of white students
in the Richmond school system had decreased from 20,259 in 1954, the
31. The impact of the Swann decision was felt greatly in the metropolitan areas. The school
boards were then under a duty to undo the attendance zones created by segregated housing by
transporting large numbers of students to create racially balanced schools. Swann indicated that
the neighborhood school attendance patterns used by many Northern schools would have to be
abandoned if the dual school system in the metropolitan areas was the result of past or present

discriminatory practices.
32.

338 F. Supp. 67 (E.D. Va. 1972).

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 25

year of the Brown decision, to 12,622 in 1969. The surrounding counties
of Chesterfield and Henrico had increased their white student population during this same period by a figure corresponding to the total white

student decline in Richmond. After the annexation, instead of a projected enrollment of 20,259 white students, only 17,259 actually enrolled. The following year, white enrollment fell further to 13,500. In
contrast to the sharp decline in enrollment among whites, black enrollment in the Richmond school system doubled from 15,598 in 1954 to
30,785 in 1971.33 As a result, the Richmond school system became
predominantly black while the suburban schools in Henrico and Chesterfield counties became over 90 percent white.34 In explanation of the

school attendance figures, demographic studies of Richmond indicate
that the all-black inner city is encircled by transitional neighborhoods
from which whites are moving and into which blacks are moving. 35
While the population shifts between the city and suburban counties
during the past ten years have been striking, it isimportant to note that
the racial composition of the three jurisdictions viewed as a whole has
remained constant-67 percent white and 33 percent black." Indeed,

the white-black ratio of the three jurisdictions has not changed since
1920. Taken together, these facts suggest that what has occurred in the
Richmond metropolitan area, which includes the adjacent counties of
Henrico and Chesterfield, is the realignment of a basically stable population group. There is apparently no evidence to suggest either an exo-

dus of whites or a massive infusion of blacks.
The instant desegregation suit, involving numerous issues, 37 had
been before the court for several years. Plaintiffs'38 theory of action was
33. Id. at 185.
34. Id. For the school year 1970-71, the Henrico County School system was 91.87% white
with a total pupil population of 34,470. The Chesterfield County system for the same period was
90.5% white with a total student population of 23,754.
35. Id. at 72-74, 212-14.
36. Id. at 185. This constant racial proportion takes into account the total student population
increase from 82,761 to 106,521.
37. Previously reported matters in the instant case can be found in 325 F. Supp. 82P (E.D.
Va. 1971) (adoption of desegregation plan for Richmond utilizing busing); 53 F.R.D. 28 (E.D. Va.
1971) (motion for counsel fees denied); 324 F. Supp. 456 (E.D. Va. 1971) (motion denied to prevent
school construction during pendency of the suit and denial of plaintiffs' motion to implement plan
at mid-year); 324 F. Supp. 439 (E.D. Va. 1971) (motion to recuse denied); 324 F. Supp. 401 (E.D.
Va. 1971) (motion to dismiss denied); 324 F. Supp. 396 (E.D. Va. 1971) (motion for 3-judge district
court denied); 317 F. Supp. 555 (E.D. Va. 1970) (court approved a freedom-of-choice plan primarily to ensure the opening of school for the fall semester).
38. Plaintiffs, black students in the Richmond school system and the School Board of
Richmond, made almost identical motions for the consolidation of the Richmond, Henrico County,
and Chesterfield County school systems. The procedural approach taken by the City School Board
in making this motion was the filing of a cross-claim against the state and county defendants. In
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composed of three main contentions: first, that the pupils of the city of
Richmond were attending a racially identifiable school system when
examined in conjunction with the entire Richmond metropolitan area,
which includes the counties of Henrico and Chesterfield; 9 secondly,
that past discriminatory acts by state and local officials40 created and
helped to perpetuate a dual school system that has denied members of
plaintiffs' class an equal educational opportunity;4 and thirdly, that the
continued maintenance of the dual school system is a violation of the
equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment.42 Accordingly,
plaintiffs moved to consolidate the public schools of Richmond, Henrico
County, and Chesterfield County in order to create a unitary, nonracial
school system. In response to that motion, the court declared that the
duty to take all reasonable steps to meet the unitary standard was not
to be limited by school district boundaries if they were being maintained
by state and local authorities for the perpetuation of a dual school
system. Therefore, by disregarding the divisional lines separating the
school systems under attack, the court found that a dual school system
existed within the Richmond metropolitan area and ordered the consolidation of the Richmond, Henrico County, and Chesterfield County
school districts for the purpose of providing the metropolitan area with
a nonracial, unitary school system.
IV.

ANALYSIS OF THE COURT'S REASONING AND IMPACT OF THE DECISION

A.

The Court's Legal Reasoning

As in most desegregation cases, once the Bradley court had linked
the action of the state to the perpetuation of the dual school system, the
final result was inevitable. The court was under aduty to assert its broad
equitable powers under the fourteenth amendment to fashion the appropriate remedy. In his findings of fact and conclusions of law, Judge
response to a motion to dismiss the cross-claim, the court upheld this cross-claim as within the
constitutional obligation of the school board to provide its pupils equal educational opportunities.
338 F. Supp. at 229-30. See also Brewer v. Hoxie School Dist. No. 46, 238 F.2d 91 (8th Cir. 1956).
At the time of this motion, the Richmond school system was operating under a court-ordered plan

which required extensive busing but the system had a variation of racial composition from a high
of 57% white to a low of 21% white in the high schools. Bradley v. School Bd., 325 F. Supp. 828,
835 (E.D. Va. 1971).

39. 338 F. Supp. at 79.
40. In the instant case, defendants are members of the Virginia State Board of Education,
the State Superintendent of Public Instruction, members of the school boards of Henrico and
Chesterfield counties, and the City Council and School Board of the City of Richmond.
41. 338 F. Supp. at 79-80.
42. Id.
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Merhige carefully followed the approach employed in Swann. Two
aspects of the opinion, however, set Bradley well apart from prior desegregation cases: its rationale for concluding that there was state involvement in making the school systems of the Richmond area predominantly one-race systems and its consolidation order affecting, as it did,
the school systems of three traditionally separate governmental units.
Before Bradley, the duty to provide a nonracial, unitary school
system had never been construed to require the invasion of a school
district's autonomy. The difficulty facing the court in justifying the
merger of the three school districts was articulating its result in terms
of the equal protection analysis adopted by the courts in most prior
school cases. To hold that for school desegregation purposes the three
political divisions were a single unit, the court could not look to the
official acts of the local school boards even though the Supreme Court
has specifically placed the duty to desegregate on them. The school
boards could not be held accountable for the racial composition of
schools outside their jurisdiction. Nor could they be held responsible for
the existence or placement of the boundary lines separating their respec"tive districts. Thus, the court was compelled to trace the responsibility
for the predominantly one-race school systems to their origin at the
state rather than the local level. Viewing the local school boards as
administrative arms of the state government,43 the court observed that
state government at the state level had the power to determine the
boundaries of the local school systems and to guide their operation. In
the judgment of the Bradley court, the failure of the Richmond, Henrico
County, and Chesterfield County school boards to achieve racial balance was, in reality, the failure of the state government to draw the
school district boundaries in a manner consistent with its duty to create
unitary, nonracial school systems. Thus, by taking into account the legal
relationship between organs of local and state governments, Judge Merhige was able to isolate the prerequisite state action for ordering the
consolidation of the school systems in the Richmond metropolitan area.
The evidence clearly supports the court's findings on this point: the local
operating funds of the public schools in Virginia were derived in large
measure from the state;" the state board held separate conferences for
black faculty members; 5 and the State Department of Education had
43. "IT]hey [political subdivisions] have been traditionally regarded as subordinate governmental instrumentalities created by the State to assist in the carrying out of state governmental
functions . . . . and the 'number, nature, and duration of the powers conferred upon [them] . ..
and the territory over which they should be exercised rests in the absolute discretion of the State.'"
Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 575 (1964).
44. 338 F. Supp. at 92.
45. Id. at 94.
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the power, which had never been invoked for desegregation purposes,
to consolidate school systems across county lines.
Aside from the court's novel state action analysis, the State Board
of Education's statutory power 46 to consolidate into one school district
areas comprising two or more political subdivisions provides an additional legal justification for disregarding the school district boundary
lines-a justification that may reduce the significance of the decision
itself. This power to consolidate two or more school districts could be
exercised under the statute without local school board consent. 41 In
essence, the consolidation of the school districts in Bradley was an
action that had been expressly authorized by state law, 4 and it is accurate to suggest that the court went no further with its order than the State
Board of Education could have gone. 49 Nevertheless, the presence of
the statute can only cast doubt on the general applicability of the court's
state action analysis. If a statute similar to that in Bradley is characterized as essential to a finding of state action by other courts, the Bradley
decision would probably have substantial impact only in those states
having similar enactments. In those cases, the state could circumvent
Bradley easily by repealing its consolidation statute as the Virginia
legislature did after state and county school officials were joined in the
Richmond suit. In states having no law authorizing the consolidation
of school districts, an order formulated on the Bradley prototype could
be attacked as exceeding the court's fourteenth amendment remedial
powers and, given the present political climate, such an attack could
probably succeed. On the other hand, if the Virginia consolidation law
is viewed as merely one of many factors that the Bradley court examined
in arriving at its state action determination, the decision could well
produce dramatic repercussions in many metropolitan areas.
As a final justification for the consolidation order, the court in
Bradley advanced the proposition that under the equal protection clause
the federal courts have always had the power to fashion such remedies
even if exercise of the power necessitated judicial intervention into the
workings of state and local government." Hence, the court dismissed the
argument raised by defendants that state subdivisional boundaries are
46.

Id. at 92.

47. VA. CODE ANN. § 22-100.1, to -.2 (1950), as amendedVA. CODE ANN. § 22-100.1, to .2 (Supp. 1971).
48. In practice, however, no districts had been combined unless the districts involved had
requested the consolidation.
49. The repealed Virginia statute had read as follows: "The State Board shall divide the
State into appropriate school divisions, in the discretion of the Board, comprising not less than
one county or city each, but no county or city shall be divided in the formation of such division."
VA. CODE ANN. § 22-30 (1950).
50. Cf. Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1 (1964); Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368 (1963);
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inviolable.5' Crucial to the court's reasoning in this regard were the
Supreme Court's voting rights cases of Reynolds v. Sims52 and
Gomillion v. Lightfoot,53 both of which ordered changes in state
governmental structures to remedy equal protection violations. In Reynolds, the Supreme Court upheld a federal district court's reapportionment of the Alabama legislature and in Gomillion, it invalidated a city's
boundary lines because they had been drawn to exclude virtually all
black voters. Both Reynolds and Gomillion stand for the principle that,
once a state acts affirmatively, it must act fairly to provide equal protection of the laws. On this point, Bradley closely parallels Reynolds and
Gomillion. In the latter cases, the states provided the franchise for its
citizens but failed to accord them equal voting power; in Bradley, the
state provided a system of public education but failed to assure blacks
of equal educational opportunity. In Baker v. Carr,54 another voting
rights case, the Bradley court found further support for its decision. In
Baker, the state's original action was constitutionally valid. After many
years, however, population shifts in Tennessee made representation in
the state legislature disproportionate to the distribution of population
among the legislative districts. When the Tennessee legislature failed to
correct this inequality, the Supreme Court intervened and ordered reapportionment. In Bradley, the court accomplished much the same result,
since it issued the consolidation order to remedy the inaction by the
State of Virginia in the face of population shifts in the Richmond area
that jeopardized the maintenance of equal educational opportunities in
the public schools.
The Court's Policy Premises
The keystone of the Bradley decision's reasoning is the sweeping
and controversial principle that integration is a prerequisite to achieving
equal educational opportunity."5 This principle is also manifested in the
B.

Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962); Atleson, The Aftermath of Baker v. Carr-An Adventure in
Judicial Experimentation, 51 CALW. L. REv. 535 (1963); Friedelbaum, Baker v. Carr: The New
Doctrine ofJudicialIntervention andIts Implicationsfor American Federalism, 29 U. Chi. L. Rev.
673 (1962); McCloskey, The Reapportionment Case, 76 HARV. L. REv. 54 (1962); Pollak, Judicial
Power and "The Politics of the People," 72 YALE L.J. 81 (1962).
51. The court pointed out that the state had previously disregarded county lines and school
district boundaries for school assignment purposes. For example, Curberland County had provided tuition for white students to attend school in Powhatan and Prince Edward counties to avoid
integration. Also, until 1965, Greene County bused its black students to an adjoining county
because there was no black school in Greene County. 338 F. Supp. at 159.
52. 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
53. 364 U.S. 339 (1960).
54. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
55. "The overwhelming evidence before this Court is to the effect that in a bi-racial com-
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Brown I decision, which was grounded upon the finding that all-black
schools are inherently unequal. Although the Bradley court was aware
that the all-black schools in Richmond suffered from physical infirmities, it resisted the conclusion that an equalization of per capita educational expenditures would achieve equal educational opportunity.-6 As
beneficial as the implementation of a system of equal funding might be,
Judge Merhige intimated that it still would not remove the stigma from
all-black schools, which he characterized as unequal per se.57 One of the
overriding considerations in Bradley was the thesis that social interaction among children of different races constitutes an essential aspect of
the educational process in our multiracial society. If implemented in the
context of a truly unitary school system, the concept could well produce
enduring benefits for the entire community. Greater contact between
children of different races during the formative stages of their personal
and social development could serve to reduce racial stereotyping and
encourage attitudes of tolerance and understanding toward all individuals in society. A forum would exist for the exchange of values and ideas
between members of different races. Studies have shown that black
students in schools having a white majority tend to achieve higher
grades and absorb the broader occupational aspirations of white students. 8 White students, on the other hand, could develop an appreciation for black culture and an empathy for black concerns. Hopefully,
through this process, racial tensions will not be an insoluble problem for
future generations. Despite the controversy that Bradley may arouse,
suggesting as it does that racial interaction is an essential element of a
minority child's equal educational opportunity, the decision, in reality,
requires that the public schools do no more than they have always done.
In that sense, Bradley contemplates no radical departures. Public
schools have always been the institution through which the national
traditions and fundamental values have been transmitted to the nation's

munity, as here, meaningful integration is an essential element of securing equality of education."
338 F. Supp. at 114.
56. In Serrano v. Priest, 487 P.2d 1241, 96 Cal. Rptr. 601 (1971), the California Supreme
Court held that a public school financing system based upon local property taxes violated the equal
protection clause because of the resulting disparities in school revenue. If the instant court had
grounded its decision solely upon the unequal financial structure of the school districts, Judge
Merhige's order would have been merely the ordering of equal funding rather than the more drastic

busing order.
57. "[Tihe Court finds, that the educational harm to children from racially separated schools
in the area involved herein, is to the black child similar. if not identical to the harm incurred prior
to the Brown decision of 1954." 338 F. Supp. at 210.
58. M. WEINBERG, DESEGREGATION RESEARCH: AN APPRAISAL 87 (1970). See generally
U.S. COMM.ON CIVIL RIGHTS, EQUALITY OF EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY (Coleman Report).
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children. Given the multiracial character of our society, it scarcely can
be doubted that the public schools should try to inculcate upon the
young the value of racial tolerance. Indeed, in this era, a child's socialization experience in the schools would be incomplete without it.
Another important policy question dealt with in Bradley was
whether the court should exercise its power to counteract the effects of
the segregated housing patterns in the Richmond area. Statistics indicate that in cities where court-ordered integration has taken place many
white families have refused to enroll their children in the public school
system. 9 These families apparently have been willing to bear the additional expense of either sending their children to private schools or of
moving outside the school system boundaries, which in most cases entails a move to the suburbs. The white exodus, unfortunately, is part of
a vicious circle. As more whites join it, pressure mounts on the remaining white families to leave also, until formerly integrated schools and
neighborhoods have become resegregated.6 ° The Bradley court's grand
strategy was to curb this flight and eliminate the suburbs as havens from
school integration by consolidating the suburban school systems with
that of Richmond. It reasoned that consolidation accompanied by a
comprehensive busing plan would make the primary reason for leaving
Richmond-escaping integration-a futile endeavor, and would therefore result in a higher level of integration in housing throughout the
city. The validity of this reasoning is at best questionable."' It is
superficial in the sense that the court simply does not account for all
the possibilities. Today, housing patterns tire a function of numerous
factors, many of them economic.6 2 School integration, or the lack of it,
does not appear to be the overriding determinant of residential location.
Although the suburbs can offer a broader range of amenities, including
convenient shopping, lower property taxes, and tolerable levels of air
59. Following the busing order in Nashville, Tennessee, for the 1971-72 school year, 1,200
white students left the metropolitan school system for adjoining counties and 2,400 students enrolled in private schools. Out of a total enrollment of 87,928 over 6,000 students dropped out of
the metropolitan system. In the Nashville busing order the 5th and 6th grades were bused more
heavily than any other grades and the corresponding drop-out rate in the metropolitan system was
highest among the 5th and 6th grade pupils. This trend plainly suggests that the decline in enrollment of white students in the urban schools is in large part attributable to the busing order. Because
the total drop in enrollment exceeded 6,000, the metropolitan school 'system lost $2 million in
equalizing funds from the state. Figures are available upon request in the Division of Pupil Accounting, Records, & Transfers of the Metropolitan Public School System of Nashville, Tennessee.
See also Nashville Tennessean, Feb. 25, 1972, at 17, col. 8.
60. See A. BICKEL, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE IDEA OF PROGRESS 136-37 (1970);
Bumpy Road in Richmond, Time, Feb. 28, 1972, at 15.
61. One author has suggested that segregated schools might lead to a higher level of housing
integration than integrated schools. The Supreme Court, 1970 Term, 85 HARV. L. REV. 3, 77 &
n.21 (1971).
. 62. Id. at 77 & n.20.
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and noise pollution, the move to the suburbs is precluded unless the
financial capacity of the family qualifies it to undertake the shift. Since
a much larger number of white families than black can afford to leave
the city for the suburbs, the suburbs are generally predominantly white.
Another motive prompting white families to emigrate to the allwhite suburbs is grounded in racial prejudice. The white family often
leaves to escape feared racial violence and the disturbingly high crime
rates associated with the predominantly black inner city. Moreover,
many white families unjustifiably anticipate that the violence of the
ghetto will accompany the influx of black residents into formerly allwhite neighborhoods. Unscrupulous real estate dealers capitalize on and
promote this sort of racial fear through block-busting and panic sale
techniques. Consequently, the formerly all-white neighborhoods are
transformed rather rapidly into all-black neighborhoods. Since these
forces behind the isolation of blacks in the central city have little to do
with public school integration, the court's policy argument that consolidation of school districts will effectively solve the problem of segregated
housing patterns seems tenuous at best.
Can the courts realistically be expected to reverse the exodus to the
suburbs or to alter the desire of many whites to live in all-white neighborhoods? Clearly, they cannot. The courts generally have been ineffective in attempts to resolve immediately problems rooted in long standing
social custom. At the same time, the individual in this country has
always resisted governmental intrusion into his personal affairs. The
Supreme Court's eighteen-year struggle to desegregate the public
schools is a lesson on the practical limitations of seeking immediate
reform in the social order through judicial mandate. In Bradley, the
court seemingly ignored these historical realities, and thus substantial
doubt exists that the consolidation order will have any present impact
in terms of housing desegregation. While it probably realized that it
could not successfully effect immediate demographic changes, the court
felt that the consolidation order could have some future impact on
housing patterns. The socialization process that the court deemed so
essential to an equal educational opportunity ultimately could result in
greater economic power for blacks and in reduced racial tensions. If
these steps are achieved, housing integration would be much more likely
to succeed. While the consolidation order was clearly supported by the
court's legal analysis of state action and of the voting rights cases, the
court was apparently willing to accept the present inconveniefices forced
upon the school children as the necessary cost for the possible future
impact of the consolidation order on the desegregation of housing pat-
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terns. Thus the consolidation order represents only an interim step toward the ultimate goal of housing integration.

V.

BRADLEY IN PERSPECTIVE: THE SEARCH FOR ALTERNATIVES

The furor engendered, both nationally and in Richmond, 3 by the
Bradley decision has been clearly disproportionate to the impact that
the consolidation order will have on the Richmond community. The
consolidation order requires only an increased busing of 10,000 students
over the 68,000 already being bused under the present system. It does
not require the purchase of additional buses, nor does it require any
further expenditures.64 Through the administrative adjustments necessitated by the consolidation order are relatively minor, the national publicity that accompanied the decision has provided significant impetus for
national antibusing forces to seek legislative relief from court-ordered
busing. In response to this groundswell of opposition, Congress has
recently considered both legislation and the passage of a constitutional
amendment to prevent the use of busing as a remedial device for desegregating the schools. 6 5 The President also has reaffirmed his opposition
'to busing by calling for a national moratorium against the issuance of
new busing orders.66 Because of the nation's truculent mood on this
question, the use of busing as a means of desegregating the public
schools is seriously threatened.
Although no desegregation plan yet devised integrates the schools
as effectively as busing, the pressure of political opposition to it suggests
that alternatives should be considered. One alternative, which permits
retention of neighborhood schools and offers relief for inner city
schools, is the decentralization of school board control. Recently, many
articles and commission studies have concluded that decentralization in
large urban areas would upgrade the quality of education for the urban
63. E.g., No Place to Hide, TIME, Jan. 24, 1972, at 38.
64. The Busing Issue Boils Over, TIME, Feb. 28, 1972, at 14.
65. N.Y. Times, March 14, 1972, at 39, col. 4; The Busing Issue Boils Over, TIME, Feb. 28,
1972, at 14; See A Step Backwards, TIME, March 6, 1972, at 25; The Basics of Integration, Wall
Street J., Jan. 26, 1972, at 14, col. 1. In the recent straw ballot in the Florida presidential primary,
74% of the voters favored banning busing. N.Y. Times, March 15, 1972, at 32, col. 7. The same
question posed in the Tennessee and Texas primaries resulted in 80% and 77% of the vote, respectively, against busing. The Nashville Tennessean, May 5, 1972, at 1, col. 3; Nashville Banner, May
8, 1972, at I, col. 5.
66. In response to mounting public sentiment against busing, President Nixon has apparently
taken the position that busing will not be required if the impoverished inner city schools receive
adequate funding to upgrade the quality of the education that they offer. N.Y. Times, March 17,
1972, at 1, col. 8.
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student. 7 This approach would place greater control of the neighborhood school in the hands of the neighborhood itself, thereby placing the
central metropolitan school board primarily in a supervisory capacity.
The need for decentralization appears greatest in ghetto areas where
residents have little if any influence over the institutions that regulate
their lives."8 A neighborhood school board could provide greater flexibility to meet the exigencies of the individual school, serve a cathartic
function by allowing the airing of local grievances, and grant ghetto
residents control over at least one institution that helps shape the lives
of their children. A prerequisite for successful implementation of decentralization is the state-wide adoption of a system of equal funding that
would eliminate the inequities of present school funding systems which
are based substantially or entirely upon local property taxes. 9
Already adopted by a few states, this equal funding system would
require the state to appropriate funds for a school system's entire budget
on the basis of its per capita enrollment. Thus, the distinction between
schools in the wealthy and poor areas of a state could be minimized, if
not eliminated.
Although equal funding and local control represent another method
of achieving what Brown I contemplated-equal educational opportunity-they do not ensure racial balance in the public schools to the extent
that busing and consolidation would. The approach that equal funding
and local control embody is embarrassingly similar in effect to the
doctrine of "separate but equal.1 7 Nevertheless, if the programs are
implemented in conjunction with the careful drawing of school attendance zones and the fair selection of school construction sites, some
integration, with its attendant social benefits, can be achieved. The most
significant advantage of basing the educational system on equal funding
and decentralization is the potential for restoring political calm. Perhaps at this stage of the long and bitter battle for equal educational
opportunity, such a compromise represents the best that can be
managed.*
67. Note, Urban School Decentralization: The Problem of the One and the Many, 5:1
COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROB. 137 (1969); Note, School Decentralization:Legal Paths to Local
Control, 57 GEo. L.J. 922 (1969); Note, New York City School Decentralization, 3 PROSPECTUS

228 (1969).
68. Note, School Decentralization:Legal Paths to Local Control, supra note 67, at 105557; Note, New York City School Decentralization, supra note 67, at 228-29.
69. Cf. note 56 supra and accompanying text.
70. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
* Since this comment was prepared for publication, the United States Court of Appeal for
the Fourth Circuit has reversed the Bradley decision. The court held that the district court had
exceeded its remedial powers under the fourteenth amendment, and that, absent a finding that
school district boundaries were drawn to further racial segregation, courts must defer to the
reserved powers of the states. Bradley v. Richmond School Bd., 40 U.S.L.W. 2813 (June 5, 1972).

